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Grammaticality, Paraphrase and Imagery
1. IN TR O D U C TIO N
The concept of grammaticality is a crucial one in generative linguistics 
since Chomsky (1957) chose it to be the very basis for defining a natural 
language. The fundamental aim of linguistic analysis was said to be to 
separate the grammatical sequences from the- ungrammatical ones and 
to study the structure of the grammatical ones. It is, therefore, not 
surprising to see that this central linguistic notion became the subject of 
much study and controversy. A major part of the discussions centered 
around the following points: (a) semigrammaticality, (b) reliability and 
validity of grammaticality judgments, (c) the psychological status of 
linguistic (e.g., grammaticality) intuitions.
(a) Though the principal distinction is that between grammatical and 
ungrammatical, there may be different degrees of ungrammaticality. 
Various authors have developed theories on degrees of ungrammaticali­
ty (Chomsky 1964; Katz 1964; Ziff 1964; Lakoff 1971). They are all 
based on the consideration that given a grammar, ungrammaticality can 
be varied as a function of the seriousness and number of rule violations. 
These theories are based on the principle that absolute grammaticality 
exists and that only strings outside the language show degrees of (un-) 
grammaticality. It should be noted that other linguists never used a 
notion of absolute grammaticality. Harris’ transformation theory, 
especially his operator grammar (1970), is based on the principle that 
transformations preserve the order of grammaticality; e.g., if two 
passives have a certain order of grammaticality, this order should be 
preserved for the corresponding actives. This is a major test case for the 
correct formulation of transformation rules. In this way there is no 
linguistic need for the notion of absolute grammaticality. Levelt (1974c) 
studied the question to what degree linguists would be handicapped (i.e., 
linguistic theory would become untestable) if the notion of absolute 
grammaticality were replaced by this ‘preservation-of-order’ principle. It
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turns out that very little of interest is lost, whereas some unexpected 
gains are made. Moreover, the logical definition of a language as a set of 
strings no longer requires the notion of absolute grammaticality. Fuzzy 
set theory (Zadeh 1971) makes it possible to meaningfully discuss 
degrees of set-membership. It would be very advantageous if linguistic 
theory construction could do without the notion of absolute grammati­
cality, especially in view of the following point.
(b) The reliability of absolute grammaticality judgments turns out to 
be very low. Various recent experiments (L.evelt 1972; Greenbaum 1973; 
Snow 1974) testify to this. In the early years of the transformational 
grammar this was not an important issue, since the ‘clear cases’, i.e., the 
highly uncontroversial cases of grammaticality and ungrammatically, 
were sufficient for constructing and testing linguistic theory. It was 
expected that, in its turn, the theory constructed in such a way would 
decide on the ‘unclear cases’. This hope has vanished: more and more 
subtle theory is now being constructed on less and less clear cases. In 
such a situation one would expect linguistics to turn to appropriate 
behavioral methods of data gathering and (statistical) analysis. Nothing 
of the sort occurs, however. Levelt (1972) showed that various proce­
dures that are used for obtaining grammaticality judgments lead to 
systematic biases and distortions. We know of no linguistic studies, 
except Greenbaum’s, where grammaticality judgments are put to statis­
tical test in order to accept or reject certain linguistic hypotheses. Levelt 
(1974c) gives examples of testing various linguistic theories by means of 
experimentally obtained linguistic judgments.
The validity of grammaticality judgments has been studied by several 
authors (cf\ Maclay and Sleator 1960; Quirk and Svartvik 1966), 
especially in order to relate the notion to other linguistic intuitions, such 
as meaningfulness, or to psychological variables like comprehensibility. 
In the present paper another psychological variable, imagery, will be 
related to grammaticality.
(c) The theoretical scope of Chomsky’s transformational grammar 
was greatly expanded when it was taken to be a description of the 
language user’s linguistic competence, not merely a formal system 
characterizing a certain linguistic set. Linguistic intuitions became the 
royal way into an understanding of the competence which underlies all 
linguistic performance. However, if such a linguistic competence exists 
at all, i.e., some relatively autonomous mental capacity for language, 
linguistic intuitions seem to be the least obvious data on which to base 
the study of its structure. They are very derived and rather artificial 
psycholinguistic phenomena which develop late in language acquisition
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(Gleitman et al. 1972) and are very dependent on explicit teaching and 
instruction. They cannot be compared with primary language use such 
as speaking and listening. The empirical domain of Chomskian linguis­
tics is linguistic intuitions. The relation between these intuitions and 
man’s capacity for language, however, is highly obscure. An extensive 
discussion of these issues can be found in Levelt (1974c).
It is this latter point that we want to take up in the present article. Our 
question will be a psychological one: Where do grammaticality intui­
tions come from? It makes no sense to assume a priori that the domain of 
linguistic intuition is a relatively closed one, as many linguists appear to 
do. Such intuitions are highly dependent on our knowledge of the world 
and on the structure of our inferential capacities. So the general 
question should be: what sort of process underlies the formation of a 
grammaticality judgment? The only way to approach this question is to 
ignore all a priori linguistic restrictions and to regard it as a problem in 
human information processing.
At the same time it should be obvious that answering this question 
will require much experimentation. At present, however, this is still a 
virginal area. We know of one remarkable study where a process 
analysis is made of grammaticality judgments: Moore (1972) studied this 
behavior vis-à-vis sentences where subject, verb or object was the locus 
of ungrammaticality. Reaction time analysis showed a definite order of 
focusing the different parts of the sentence in forming the judgment.
Moore did not go into the question of how judgment of the focused 
part took place. One could think of various factors playing a role here. It 
is one possibly important factor which we want to take up in this paper: 
imagery. Analysis of this factor may, as we shall see, show some light on 
the processing of sociolinguistic cues in speech perception.
2. T H E  USE O F IMAGERY
If one asks an inlormant how he performs the judgment task, a usual 
answer is something like: T try to imagine a situation in which the phrase 
or sentence can be said.’ The informant seems to ‘use’ imagery in 
answering the grammaticality or acceptability question: ne tries to lind a 
cognitive, preferably visual, context in which the sentence could make 
sense. But what exactly does it mean to ‘use imagery’?
A decade of imagery research has not solved this problem. It is 
especially still controversial whether humans have two separate repre­
sentational systems for verbal and nonverbal information, respectively.
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If one believes this to be the case (Paivio 1971. 1974), ‘using imagery’ is 
addressing the non-verbal representational system during information 
processing. The facilitative effect of using imagery in interpreting words, 
phrases or sentences could then partly be ascribed to the fact that two 
representational systems, instead of one, are involved in the comprehen­
sion or judgment task. If one assumes the existence of only one general 
representational system (Anderson and Bower 1973), ‘using imagery’ 
reduces to an attractive triviality: instructing the subject to use imagery 
in some comprehension or memory task would only encourage him to 
spontaneously generate ‘expansion’ of the verbal material. He would, in 
a more extensive way, ‘scan’ the meanings (i.e., representations) of the 
different elements in the material, which means retrieving various 
connected memory structures, etc. This would increase the probability 
of finding the connections that are crucial for the experimental task. The 
facilitative effect of ‘using imagery’ should be a-specific, according to 
this theory: it is not the image that intervenes and causes the solution, 
but the experience of an image is an epiphenomenon which is caused by 
enhanced memory activity. Anderson and Bower present rather convin­
cing experimental evidence for their position, but it is not necessary here 
to prejudge this theoretical controversy. There is full agreement that the 
instruction to ‘use imagery’ is facilitative for a large variety of compre­
hension and memory tasks. This facilitative effect can, moreover, be 
obtained by using concrete (or ‘high imagery’) material. Abstract (or 
‘low imagery’) material is harder to use in verbal tasks, leading to more 
errors and longer reaction times. It is, therefore, clear that the judgment 
process itself is different in the two cases.
3. G E N E R A L  H Y PO TH ESES
In this paper we want to consider whether this difference in process also 
leads to differences in grammaticality judgments. In line with the general 
findings we would, more specifically, expect the following results:
(1) Grammaticality is higher for high imagery (or concrete) verbal 
material than for low imagery (or abstract) material.
(2) Grammaticality judgments are faster for high imagery (H.I.) 
material than for low imagery (L.I.) material.
We assumed that, in making a grammaticality judgment, the subject 
tries to find a context in which the sentence or phrase makes sense, i.e., a 
possible interpretation of the sentence. If this is the crucial part of the 
process, we would expect the same pattern of reaction times in para­
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phrase production as in grammaticality judgments:
(3) Paraphrasing will be quicker for H.I. than for L.I. material.
4. T H E E X P E R IM E N T
Material and pre-experiment. In this experiment we used Dutch com­
pounds as material to be judged. We took care that these compound 
constructions were not standard lexical items in Dutch, since in that case 
the judgment task could be performed by straight reference to the 
internal lexicon without further inference. In all other cases, using 
compounds is a productive process, in the same sense as creating 
sentences. However, we were interested in varying this productivity for 
the following reason. Certain types of lexical compounds are much more 
frequent than others. Frequent types are noun/noun (NN) and verb 
/noun (VN) compounds, whereas noun/adjective (NA) and adjective 
I noun (AN) compounds are rather infrequent. It is quite likely that a 
certain type of lexical compound is relatively frequent if the number of 
possible semantic relations between the two constituent elements is 
relatively high. This is certainly true for NN compounds where we have 
a large diversity of possible semantic connections. Lees (1960), who 
treats compounds as surface structures which are transformationally 
derived from deep structures, observes the following underlying gram­
matical relations to be mirrored in NN compounds, examples in 
parentheses referring to different sub-types:
subject/ predicate (girlfriend)
subject/middle object (doctor's office, arrowhead, armchair) 
subject/verb (snake bite, gunshot, farm production, investment bank) 
subject/object (windmill, milk bar, fingerprint, grocery store) 
verb/object (bull fighting, birth control, book review, bartender, disc 
jockey)
subject/prepositional object (ashtray, airmail, bulldog, egghead, 
snowball, date line, aircraft)
verb/prepositional object (reception desk, color photography) 
object/prepositional object (tearoom, football, apple sauce, mud pie, 
apple cake, iron age).
Underlying relations for VN compounds are, according to Lees:
subject/verb (wading bird, dance team)
verb/object (call girl, pickpocket, chewing gum)
verb/prepositional object (bakehouse, playing cards).
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These productive forms are contrasted with AN compounds, which only 
express subject/predicate relations (madman, red skin). Lees does not 
treat NA constructions, since his object of study is nominalizations. One 
could think of ‘as-as’ relations (blood red, stone dead), adjective + 
prepositional phrase relations (top heavy), etc. (see Quirk et ai, 1972, 
1028).
According to Dutch frequency counts, VN constructions are about 6 
times as frequent as AN constructions (which are more frequent than NA 
compounds); NN compounds are 4 times as frequent as VN construc­
tions. This order corresponds well with the order of transformational 
productivity.
We would expect that for non-lexical compounds (i.e., compounds 
which are not standard items in the dictionary), those that allow for a 
large variety of semantic relations (NN and to a lesser degree VN) will 
allow for quicker processing, i.e., smaller reaction times for paraphrase 
and grammaticality judgments. Psychologically, this is for exactly the 
same reason as the facilitative effect of imagery: more ‘expansions’ of the 
verbal material are generated since the compound type allows for a 
higher diversity of semantic relations. An additional hypothesis, there­
fore is
(4) Lexically productive types of compounds (NN, VN) are, with 
respect to less productive types (NA, AN), judged and paraphrased 
faster and rated more grammatical.
A corollary to this last hypothesis is that ambiguous types of com­
pounds (i.e., compounds like ‘gold light ’ which can be conceived of either 
as NN or as NA) will more probably be interpreted, and therefore 
paraphrased, as the more productive form (in this case NN). Also, they 
will behave like the more productive form with respect to reaction times 
and grammaticality judgments.
In order to compose the experimental material a preliminary list of 24 
supposedly high-imagery and 24 low-imagery compounds were con­
structed for each category (NN, VN, NA, AN), as well as 9 ambiguous 
compounds for the 4 possible ambiguous types NN/NA, VN/AN, 
NN/AN, and NN/VN. This set of 228 compounds was, in different 
random orders, presented to 24 subjects for imagery ratings. Twenty- 
four of these compounds occurred twice in the list, in order that there 
should be a check on the subjects’ rating consistency. All 24 subjects 
turned out to be sufficiently consistent: rank correlations ranged from 
.52 to .99, with an average of .83. We followed an adaptation of the 
original Paivio (1971) instructions which ask the subject to rate how 
easily the material leads to mental images of things or events. The
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subjects were asked to rate their judgment for each compound on a 
seven-point scale (from 1 for ‘low imaginable’ to 7 for ‘high imaginable’). 
These rating were averaged over subjects, and on the basis of these data 
we selected the 15 highest- and 15 lowest-rated compounds for each type 
(NN, VN, NA and AN). The eight average imagery values are given in 
the first and fifth row of Table 1. Also the four highest and four lowest 
valued compounds in the ambiguous categories were determined. Since 
the latter involved leaving out one compound for each ambiguous type 
we did not obtain clear-cut imagery dichotomies for the ambiguous 
compound types. Table 2 presents average imagery values for these 
types.
The compounds obtained in this way formed the experimental 
material for the main experiment. Summing up, the stimulus material 
consisted of 15 H.I. and 15 L.I. compounds for each compound type, 
plus 8 for each of the 4 ambiguous types, i.e., 4 ( 1 5 +  15) + 4 (8) = 152 
stimuli.
5. P R O C E D U R E  AND SUBJECTS
Since we wanted to release both grammaticality judgment and para­
phrases for each compound, each of our 10 subjects participated in two 
sessions. In one session they did the paraphrase task and in the other the 
grammaticality judgments. The two sessions were separated by at least 
one day. Five subjects had the paraphrase session first, and the other 
five the grammaticality session. Subjects were men and women, of 
slightly post-college level education and ranging in age from 20 to 40. 
Each subject was treated individually.
(1) The paraphrase task. The subject was seated in front of a memory 
drum by means of which the 152 compounds could be presented one by 
one. Each subject received a different random order. The list was 
preceded by 8 trial stimuli to accustom the subject to the task.
At a signal of the experimenter a new stimulus appeared in the 
window of the memory drum, which simultaneously started an electric 
timer. As soon as the subject had his paraphrase available he pressed a 
button, which stopped the timer, and gave his paraphrase. The latter 
was noted down by the experimenter, who then proceeded to present the 
next stimulus, etc. The paraphrase-instruction was presented to the 
subject in written form, and his comprehension was carefully checked 
during the eight-trial stimuli. The instruction stressed that the subject 
should describe the meaning or interpretation of the compound.
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(2) TJie grammatically task. The stimulus presentation was the same 
as for the paraphrase task. The subject was instructed to push the button 
as soon as he had made up his mind about the grammaticality rating. At 
or directly after pushing the button, the subject orally expressed this 
rating, which could be any number from 1 (highly grammatical) to 7 
(highly ungrammatical). This numbering was continuously available to 
the subject on top of the memory drum. (In the further data analysis this 
numbering will be inversed, i.e., 7 for highly grammatical; this in order 
to make the grammaticality values compatible with the imagery values). 
The instruction given to the subject asked him to rate whether the 
stimulus could be a Dutch compound word, i.e., was ‘good Dutch1. So, 
the term ‘grammaticality’ was not used, since it seems wrong to ask a 
naive subject to use an ill-defined linguistic technical term.
6. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Average results for the different conditions and tasks are presented in 
Table I. Three separate analyses of variance were computed on the raw 
data: one for the grammaticality ratings, one for the grammaticality 
rating times and one for the paraphrase reaction times. Apart from the 
main factors high/low imagery, type of compound (NN, VN, NA, AN;
Table 1. Average values fo r  imagery (1-7), grammaticality (1-7),
rating time (sec.) and paraphrase time (sec.)
Type of com pound NN VN AN NA
High imagery
Imagery value 5.448 5.811 5.112 5.526
Grammaticali ty 5.440 5.767 4.649 5.340
Grammaticali ty  rating time 1.863 1.773 2.031 1.883
Paraphrase  reaction time 2.685 2.211 2.553 2.351
Low imagery
Imagery value 2.426 2.411 2.162 2.126
Grammaticali ty 3.233 3.467 2.913 2.706
Grammaticality  rating time 2.190 2.030 2.200 2.317
Paraphrase  reaction time 4.288 3.897 4.228 4.109
Grammaticality, paraphrase and imagery 95
the ambiguous compounds were analyzed separately) and subjects, 
another factor was carried into the analysis, namely, first vs. second 
session. It could be the case that prior presentation of the experimental 
material in the paraphrase task affects the grammaticality ratings of a 
subject in the second session, and inversely. However, no significant 
effect of this variable was found, so that we will ignore it in the 
following. We will now discuss each of the three analyses in turn.
6.1 Grammaticality ratings
Our first hypothesis predicted higher grammaticality for high imagery 
(H.I.) compounds than for L.I. compounds. This is what we found. The 
average grammaticality scale value for H.I. compounds turns out to be 
5.299, for L.I. compounds 3.180. The difference is highly significant (p <
0.00004). The other significant result relates to compound type: differ­
ent compounds have different grammaticality ( /?<0 .0 1 ): the product­
ive types are more grammatical than the less productive types: 4.337 for 
NN, 4.627 for VN versus 3.781 for NA and 4.023 for AN. This is in 
accordance with hypothesis 4.
6.2 Grammaticality rating times
The second hypothesis predicted quicker grammaticality judgments for
H.I. compounds than for L.I. compounds. Average ratings times are
I.888 sec. and 2.184 sec., respectively. The difference of 296 msec, is 
significant (p <  0.02) and in accordance with the prediction. We did not 
find a significant compound type effect.
6.3 Paraphrase reaction times
From the third hypothesis we expected shorter paraphrase reaction 
times for H.I. compounds than for L.I. compounds. The average 
reaction times are 2.450 sec. and 4.130 sec., respectively. The difference 
(1.680 msec.) is highly significant (p <  0.0004), in support of the 
hypothesis. Again, there is no significant effect of compound type, 
contrary to the prediction in hypothesis 4.
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6.4 Ambiguous compounds
The results for the ambiguous compounds are given in Table 2. In a 
corollary to hypothesis 4, we supposed that these constructions would 
behave like the more productive form with respect to reaction times and 
grammaticality judgments. In spite of several ways of analyzing the data 
we could not find any trace of such an effect. This is mainly due to the 
lack of compound-type effects for the non-ambiguous material. Hypo­
thesis 4 is only supported for grammaticality ratings, not for reaction 
times. The effect of lexical productivity seems to be quite small. We will 
return to this in the discussion.
Table 2. Average values fo r  imagery, grammaticality, rating time and
paraphrase time fo r  ambiguous compounds
Type of com pound N N /A N NN/’VN N N /N A V N /A N
Imagery value 3.770 4.359 4.778 3.843
Grammaticali ty* 4.537 4.975 4.225 4.750
Grammaticali ty  rating time 1.970 1.994 1.947 2.022
Paraphrase  reaction time 3.387 2.830 2.761 3.135
The other prediction was that ambiguous compounds would be more 
probably paraphrased in terms of the more productive form. To check 
this, we analyzed all paraphrased protocols, but again with largely 
negative results: for N N /N A  compounds we found 56% NN interpreta­
tions; for VN/AN there were 51% VN interpretations; for N N /A N  we 
had 45% NN-type paraphrases; and for NN/VN compounds, there were 
41% NN responses. In fact, within each type some compounds were 
judged one way by all subjects and other compounds just the other way. 
Many compounds gave very idiosyncratic reactions. In this light the 
number of different items per type (8) is certainly too small to draw 
conclusions either one way or the other.
7. DISCUSSION
The results of the présent experiment are strongly supportive of our 
main hypotheses (1,2, and 3), namely, that high imagery compounds are 
more grammatical and more quickly judged than low imagery com­
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pounds and that paraphrasing is quicker for H.I. than for L.I. material. 
Shortly, vve will try to interpret these findings in terms of a process 
model forjudging grammaticality. But let us first consider the additional 
hypothesis 4 for which the data gave little support. We did find that 
grammaticality is higher for lexically productive types of compounds 
than for less productive types, but neither grammaticality rating times 
nor paraphrase times were quicker for the productive types. Moreover, 
the data for ambiguous compounds did not show the expected tendency 
of a preference for the more productive interpretation of the com­
pounds. In retrospect, it seems to us that the main reason for this lack of 
support is that it is naive to suppose that a productive compound type 
(such as NN) consists of productive compounds. A compound type was 
called productive if it allows for a large variety of semantic relations. 
This does not mean, however, that each compound itself allows for a 
large variety of semantic interpretations, but only that there exists a 
large divergence of compound interpretations within the type. Actually, 
it seems to be the case that for each compound there is a strong bias 
towards one particular interpretation, irrespective of the type of the 
compound and irrespective of ambiguity. Hangman will always be 
interpreted as ‘the man hangs X', whereas pin-up girl is uniquely taken 
as ‘X pins up the girl’; in our data we found similar strong biases for 
compounds of ambiguous types, as we mentioned earlier. Therefore, 
productivity does not seem to be a property of individual compounds. 
Differences in reaction times between compounds may be related to 
other linguistic properties.
One noteworthy candidate is the ‘transparency' of the compound, i.e., 
the distance between surface form and semantic interpretation. For 
example, compare madman (the man is mad) to redskin (the skin is red
— the red skin belongs to a man —* the man belongs to a certain ethnic 
category). The latter one may take longer paraphrase and judgment 
reaction times. This transparency variable seems to be an interesting 
topic for further experimentation on grammaticality.
Let us now turn to the main results relating to the imagery variable. 
Theoretically we had supposed that the judgment process involves a 
search for a possible interpretation of the compound and that this search 
is quicker for H.I. than for L.I. material. In its turn the latter can be 
explained either by the existence of a dual verbal/nonverbal representa­
tional system (Paivio) or by a larger ‘expansion potential’ of high 
imagery material (Anderson and Bower). Since in both cases interpreta­
tion search is an integral part of the judgment process, one would expect 
a similar imagery-effect for paraphrase reaction times (hypothesis 3),
vOoo
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and this is what we found. However, further qualification is necessary in 
view of the reaction time data. Figure la represents the grammaticality 
/paraphrase model. If imagery only affects the interpretation search, 
paraphrase and grammaticality reaction times would be affected to the 
same degree. But we found a mean reaction time difference for gramma­
ticality judgments of 296 msec., as compared to 1680 msec, for para­
phrase reaction times. This leaves nearly 1400 msec, unexplained for the 
paraphrasing process.
We are left with two ways of accounting for this additional difference. 
The first is to suppose that imagery not only affects the interpretation 
search but also the later stage of paraphrase formulation. But neither in 
the Paivio model nor in the Anderson and Bower model is this 
particularly likely. For Paivio, paraphrase formulation takes place in 
the verbal system, which is not affected by imagery. For Anderson and 
Bower, no further inference is required as soon as the interpretation is 
available, and the ‘expansion potential’ interpretation of imagery would 
not work. We will shortly return to this.
The second is to suppose that no full interpretation is needed in order 
to give a grammaticality judgment. The subject may perform some 
preliminary checks on the material before starting his memory search 
(Figure lb). If these checks involve some ‘trial expansions’ in the sense 
of Anderson and Bower, they will also be sensitive to imagery. These 
checks would then explain the 296 msec, difference in our results, 
whereas the interpretation search would account for the additional 1400 
msec.
In order to experimentally exclude the first alternative, one could 
choose a task in which no paraphrase formulation is required. Instead of 
compounds one could use sentences and have the subject judge the truth 
or falsity of the sentence by means of two reaction keys. If the effect of 
imagery on reaction time reduces to the amount found in the grammati­
cality task, the conclusion should be that there is an additional imagery 
effect on paraphrase formulation, If, however, the verification task and 
the paraphrase task show a substantial difference in the effect of imagery 
(and this we expect), we can maintain the present supposition that the 
grammaticality judgment does not require substantial interpretation but 
can be based on some set of pre-tests.
If this latter model is correct, the major problem is to analyze the 
nature of these preliminary checks. It is well known that similar tests are 
performed in normal listening situations. There are not only phonetic 
checks which are essential for adaptation to a speaker’s voice quality, but 
we also perform preliminary tests in the interpretive domain. Norman
L
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(1972) gives as an example the speaker’s question ‘What is Charles 
Dickens’ phone number?’ The typical reaction is not intensive memory 
search followed by T don't know’, but something like T h a t ’s a stupid 
question’. Especially worth mentioning in this context are sociolinguistic 
checks, which probably also precede interpretation in a similar fashion. 
They are sometimes of a phonetic or phonological nature (e.g., in 
determining a person’s dialect), but they may also involve some more 
interpretive activity. A nice example of the latter is the way in which the 
Javanese listener is able to quickly infer the speaker’s social status. The 
presence of some words, affixes and turns of phrase are sufficient to 
immediately derive the status relationship (see Geertz 1968). In all these 
cases no full understanding is required for the completion of the tests. 
On the other hand, the results of such checks may have important 
consequences for the further interpretive process. The interpretations of 
an utterance will often be dependent on the inferred status relationship, 
and similarly the interpretative process may be stopped, i.e., communi­
cation may break down, if acceptability checks yield negative results.
In conclusion, the imagery data strongly suggest that no full interpre­
tation is required to decide on the acceptability of a linguistic construc­
tion. The nature of the tests subjects do perform in order to cope with the 
grammaticality task stays largely in the dark. But we found that this 
testing process and its outcome is affected by imagery in the same way as 
other verbal associative and inferential processes.
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